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Abstract
The following paper explores the idea of “refugee diaspo-
ras” by focusing on a case study of the Hindu Bengali exo-
dus from East Pakistan (later Bangladesh) following the
1947 British Partition of India. The author begins by
problematizing and historicizing definitions of diasporas
in general and refugee diasporas in particular and then
uses the case study to illustrate the diversity in experiences
that different groups that emerged from the Partition en-
countered. This focus on the lived experiences of flight, re-
settlement, integration (or lack thereof), and the
rebuilding of lives helps to unravel some of the embedded
and obscured meanings that terms such as “refugee dias-
pora” might otherwise contain.
Résumé
L’article explore la notion de « diasporas de réfugiés »
qu’il illustre par l’exode d’hindous vers le Bengale depuis
l’est du Pakistan (qui deviendra le Bangladesh), à la
suite de la partition britannique des Indes de 1947. L’au-
teur commence par poser la problématique et l’historicité
des définitions se rapportant aux diasporas en général et
aux diasporas de réfugiés en particulier. Il se sert ensuite
du cas cité pour mettre en lumière la variété d’expérien-
ces auxquelles ont été soumis les divers groupes issus de la
partition. Cette focalisation sur des expériences vécues de
déplacement, de réétablissement et d’intégration (ou de
leur absence), de même que de reconstruction de vies per-
met de dénouer quelques-unes des significations implici-
tes ou moins évidentes que des expressions comme
« diaspora de réfugiés » pourraient autrement connoter.
D
iasporas have become increasing objects of study
and attention in recent years. Diasporic communi-
ties may take many forms and engage in a substan-
tial range of activities, yet “the diaspora” continues to
resonate for scholars, social movements, and national gov-
ernments (amongst others) as a locus for examining tran-
snational practices, particularly in terms of global capital
and political and cultural flows. What do diasporas and their
activities tell us about identity, citizenship, community—in-
deed, what do they tell us about the nation-state itself? How
are our notions of borders and boundaries disrupted by
groups whose idea of a “homeland” does not fit easily onto
a map or a census? This paper seeks to explore such ques-
tions  by critically interrogating the idea  of  the “refugee
diaspora.” I begin by examining the construction of “dias-
poras” as a broad category of migration—forced and other-
wise—throughout history. I look specifically at the tensions
of nationality, identity, and the connection to place which
are, in particular, markers of the “refugee diasporic” expe-
rience. I explore these issues by focusing on a specific his-
torical event—the British Partition of India in 1947—and
the diverse set of East Bengali refugee diasporas that emerge
out of this period. This case highlights some of the complexi-
ties in identifying diasporic groups (including refugee dias-
poras) as unified or monolithic communities and instead
shows some of the distinctions that class, caste, gender,
ethnicity, and religion play in constructing their narratives,
experiences, and imaginations. The final section of the paper
looks at the legacies of the Partition and East Bengali refugees
and the ongoing contestation over “home,” as these are
played out in within India and throughout the global Bengali
diaspora.
Defining and Distinguishing Diasporas
Diasporic communities have existed for centuries and in
many ways complicate modern notions of geographic and
political boundaries. They are multi-faceted social organi-
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zations, interwoven in the contemporary context with lega-
cies of colonialism and emerging trends towards cultural,
economic, political, and social globalization. Diasporas take
many forms beyond the traditional notion of persecuted
victims forced to flee their homeland, though the enduring
image of diasporic communities remains bound not to the
notion of migration, but rather to that of forced displace-
ment. It is the so-called “victim diasporas”1 that dominate
our view, such as Jewish groups persecuted across Europe
through the centuries, Africans scattered by slavery over the
Americas and the Caribbean, or, more recently, Armenians
and Palestinians, displaced by genocide or deprived of a
homeland.
But in recent years many other groups have increasingly
been  described by  the category  of diaspora. Alternative
labels are often used synonymously—transmigrants, émi-
grés, immigrants, and expatriates among them—though
these  terms  describe  sometimes very different  forms  of
population movements. Regardless of the reasons for “leav-
ing,” it is nonetheless true that generations of communities
have flourished away from their “original homelands,” re-
taining strong economic and political ties to their places of
origin and often a distinct cultural identity. Scholars have
documented many such cases throughout history, and
point to similar examples in the contemporary context.
These include trading communities such as Lebanese, Chi-
nese, Italian groups who migrated to distant shores, labour-
ers (indentured or otherwise) from various parts of the
Indian subcontinent who journeyed to Africa, the Carib-
bean, and Southeast Asia, and functionaries and soldiers
from ancient Rome and colonial Britain, Russia, France and
Belgium who spread throughout their empires. More re-
cently, the postcolonial period has seen massive migration
from former peripheries towards self-described
cores—East and West Indians in Britain, North Africans
and Southeast Asians in France, Central Asians in Russia,
to name but a few. And indeed migrant labour across the
world today represents one of the most significant flows of
population in human history, from South Asians in the
Persian Gulf to Latin Americans in the United States, and
Eastern Europeans in Western Europe and many others
besides.2 The latter example does not simply mean seasonal
workers who return to their “home” countries following the
expiration of a contract or the harvest of a crop (though it
might in some instances). Increasingly, whether arriving as
legal or undocumented labour, such migrant workers have
stayed on in host countries, settling in discrete, identifiable
communities, and sending financial support to their fami-
lies left behind.3 It is indeed this dialectic, of connections to
both a “new” and an “old” home simultaneously, that is
characteristic of diasporas, no matter what their origin.
Given this wide range of definitions, however, one might
well ask whether the category of diaspora continues to be a
useful one to describe specific communities of refugees or
whether it is too large and unwieldy as either a descriptive
label or analytical framework. Some scholars disagree with
including so many forms of population movement under
the umbrella of diaspora and argue instead that only cases
of forced migration should qualify. Others limit the term
only to its capitalized use, that of the Jewish Diaspora, while
yet others extend this narrower definition to include the
descendents of African slaves and more contemporary vic-
tims of genocide rebuilding shattered lives elsewhere.4
From such perspectives, the role of compulsion is central
in identifying whether a community is diasporic or migrant
in nature. Individuals and communities must have been
forced to shift from one place to another in order to have
been displaced. A further implicit connotation is that the
actual compulsion itself is at the behest of a human agent.
The motivations behind forced migration, in this view, are
often part of a larger political strategy, tribal animus, or base
self-interest.
But there are many problems with such a rigid reading
of population movement, even of a forced nature. It is
relatively straightforward to identify certain instances of
forced migration—being kidnapped and sold into slavery,
fleeing homes and livelihoods in the face of a violent and
oppressive state or army or mob, for example. But there are
many other and more subtle forms of pressure that have
compelled population movements throughout history. The
threat—rather than the actual experience—of violence has
been a powerful motivator for flight. As well, one could
argue that the economic motives which have driven many
groups to relocate have themselves constituted a strongly
coercive process—for example, Irish, southern Italian, and
eastern European immigration to North America in the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries or Indian travels
to the Caribbean and Africa during the same pe-
riod—though many of these migrants in strictly technical
terms “chose” to leave their homes for a new life and were
not forcibly transported as a result of conflict, slavery, or
some other unwanted compulsion. Yet many cases such as
those mentioned above arise as a result of specific economic
policies and development initiatives of colonial powers and
emerging nation-states.
Similarly important for some groups has been a potential
loss of social standing and power rather than an overt threat
of violence, as this paper will later note in the case of some
East Bengali refugees. There are also those refugees who flee
from events that have no direct evidence of human inter-
vention—certain environmental disasters or climatic
changes, for example. Other cases show human agency but
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neither overt malice or forethought nor enough considera-
tion and planning for the refugee crisis that has been cre-
ated. Development-induced displacement, for example, is
an acute crisis in the contemporary context, with close to
100 million people across the globe now forced out of their
homes and homelands for the purposes of economic devel-
opment.5 Such geographic displacement can be within a
city or district, from one village or neighbourhood to an-
other; it can also involve displacement across long distances
and borders, sometimes to economically, socially, and cul-
turally quite different settings. Development that displaces
therefore has created masses of the so-called “internally
displaced”—those dislocated not necessarily across na-
tional borders but within them. Some of these refugees have
had little say in the decisions that led to their former homes
being swallowed whole by the reservoirs of dams or the
asphalt of highways. Some have been offered varying levels
of compensation for their loss—sometimes money, some-
times land, though rarely enough or of the same quality they
previously enjoyed. Most have not chosen to be displaced;
rather, it is a reality that has been forced upon them, and
they are left sundered from homes and occupations as a
result. They are refugees in fact, if not always in law, since
the development-induced displaced are often refugees not
across borders but within them. They are the “internally
displaced,” those millions of refugees who fall outside the
1951 UN Convention on the Status of Refugees definition
restricted to an individual “outside the country of his na-
tionality.”6
Diasporas, Home, and the Nation-State
Such complexities remind us that it is important not to
confuse the exiles’ longing for “home” and “place” with
some kind of inherent connection to the nation-state. Dias-
poras certainly predate the modern post-Treaty of West-
phalia notion of the nation-state and so too do the “victim”
or “refugee diasporas,” as the historical record clearly dem-
onstrates. There is nothing to suggest that the attachment to
place arises from a flight across lines on a map or displace-
ment from one’s nationality. But in an era where the nation-
state is seen by many as the ultimate expression of
community and its existence appears inevitable (though
somewhat altered by globalization), it seems only logical that
forced displacement from the nation would be the point at
which refugees are created. Indeed, as Benedict Anderson
has argued, the very success of the idea of the nation-state
has been in (1) harnessing the latent power of “nationalist”
sentiments within the political framework of the state, and
(2) thereafter exercising control over geography, history,
demography, and the legitimate use of coercive force in the
name of that nationalist sentiment.7 The “map, the census
and the museum,” Anderson suggests, have been amongst
the most effective tools in regulating geographical bounda-
ries, population movements, and cultural memories within
a world system of nation-states.
But diasporas—and especially refugee diasporas—dis-
rupt this tidy view of nation, narration, and belonging.
Refugee diasporas may indeed be a group of people forced
by conflict or persecution to flee lands and homes to which
they have long-standing political, economic, and cultural
ties—but it is more often “homes” that are left behind,
rather than “nations.” As a community in exile, “refugee
diasporas” are often defined by their nationality—Somalis,
Afghans, Iranians—yet are their connections to “home”
predicated on the nation? Certainly within the larger dias-
poric population, the link is not so clear. Try as many
national governments might, attempts to raise funds for
various nation-building projects in putative homelands
have been far less successful than the efforts of “hometown
associations” or the more common informal transfers of
funds between family members and friends.8 The ties that
bind are more often to place than they are to the grand
notions  of an  imagined  community in the form of the
nation-state. The exile that the refugee communities expe-
rience is from their homes and the lives that they are forced
to try and reconstruct might be built as much in another
part of their country of origin as in a distant land—though
both might be equally foreign to them. The displaced from
development projects from central India often end up living
in cities on the coasts, for example, in discrete, if often
wretched communities. In other cases, populations fleeing
conflict and violence cross an international border to be-
come refugees in neighbouring countries whose popula-
tions might be quite similar in cultural practices and beliefs
to them and whose “difference” has less to do with nation-
alism and more with the arbitrary boundaries of competing
colonial powers (as in the case of many African countries).
All of this is not to say that the nation does not matter.
Indeed, for many refugee diasporas who do not come from
a nation-state with which they identify the dream instead is
of a country of their own, such as elements of the Sikh,
Kurdish, and Sri Lankan Tamil diasporas have suggested.
Still, the claim to “place” and “home” is based primarily on
what Soumitra De calls the “territorial referent,” rather
than on the necessity of the nation-state:
[While] the statehood demand is not a must for nationalism, a
territorial referent is. Nationalism proceeds to define people in
terms of shared institutions, economic, social and/or political
(such as language, religion, customs, etc.) and defends or seeks
to increase their autonomy. All  the  while  this demand  for
autonomy is made in terms of belonging to a particular terri-
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tory. Often, to make this demand compatible with the territorial
referent, nationalists mystify the connections by referring to a
remote past (usually heroic) and/or to a better future. Thus,
while a nationalist ideology is conditioned by its location in an
actual space and time, it is also a unique and creative time-space
formulation. Quite naturally,  therefore, nationalism can be
used by different social groups and classes for different and
often conflicting purposes.9
It is in the light of these complex and contested claims to
both nationalism and what might be termed “sub-nation-
alism,” therefore, that the idea of the refugee diaspora must
be evaluated, paying particular attention to the different
reasons for departure, the diverse ongoing connections to
“homelands” (real or imagined), and the differences in
experiences of the vast numbers of refugee diasporas. Many
of these groups, for example, have developed vibrant, es-
tablished, “successful” diasporic communities in their
countries of refuge; others remain marginalized, often con-
tinuing to live for decades in camps under less than ideal
conditions and denied the rights and privileges enjoyed by
their immediate neighbours. Examining the diverse and
complex experiences of resettlement, integration, and on-
going relationships with putative homelands is a key com-
ponent in understanding  the makeup and mentality of
refugee diasporas. A focus on these differences is also an
important part of not treating these groups as monolithic
entities but rather as varied as any other community. The
next section will examine such differences by focusing on
the case of the Partition of Bengal.
The Partition of India and the Creation of the
East Bengali Diasporas
The division of the Indian subcontinent by the British in
1947 at the moment of their departure signified a simulta-
neously momentous and calamitous event. The creation of
a majority Hindu India and a bifurcated, mainly Muslim
Pakistan (with eastern and western wings) was predicated
on the colonial notion of two indigenous populations locked
in eternal enmity and strife. The Partition, as the event
became known, was portrayed as a compromise solution
aimed at appeasing both sides and imposing order on a
chaotic situation. Instead, the redrawing of the map un-
leashed a torrent of bloodshed and violence scarcely seen
before or since. Nearly one million died in so-called “com-
munal” violence between Hindus and Sikhs on the one side
and Muslims on the other. An estimated fifteen million
people were displaced with close to two million killed. The
population movement itself is one of the largest in recorded
human history and the echoes of the Partition remain writ
large on the psyche and character of all three nations (India,
Pakistan, and Bangladesh) that eventually emerged out of its
ashes. It has become, as one writer describes it, a “topic of
much myth-making, intense polemics, and considerable
serious historical research.”10 The Bengali-American novel-
ist Jhumpa Lahiri describes her father’s explanation of Par-
tition and the suddenly discovered differences between East
and West Bengalis in the following manner:
“Mr. Pirzada won’t be coming today. More importantly, Mr.
Pirzada is no longer considered Indian,” my father announced,
brushing salt from the cashews out of his trim black beard. “Not
since Partition. Our country was divided. 1947.” When I said I
thought that was the date of India’s independence from Britain,
my father said, “That too. One moment we were free and then
we were sliced up,” he explained, drawing an X with his finger
on the countertop, “like a pie. Hindus here, Muslims there.
Dacca no longer belongs to us.” He told me that during Parti-
tion Hindus and Muslims had set fire to each other’s homes.
For many, the idea of eating in the other’s company was un-
thinkable. It made no sense to me. Mr. Pirzada and my parents
spoke the same language, laughed at the same jokes, looked
more or less the same. They ate pickled mangoes with their
meals, ate rice every night for supper with their hands. Like my
parents, Mr. Pirzada took off his shoes before entering a room,
chewed fennel seeds after meals as a digestive, drank no alcohol,
for dessert dipped austere biscuits into successive cups of tea.
Nevertheless my father insisted that I understand the difference,
and he led me to a map of the world taped to the wall over his
desk. He seemed concerned that Mr. Pirzada might take offense
if I accidentally referred to him as an Indian, though I could not
really imagine Mr. Pirzada being offended by much of anything.
“Mr. Pirzada is a Bengali , but he is a Muslim,” my father
informed me. “Therefore he lives in East Pakistan, not India.”11
However, it is important when examining the experi-
ences of one particular group of refugees that resulted from
this event to distinguish between the myth of the Partition
(as it has grown in the half century since it occurred) and
the actual event itself. It is important, for example, to note
that the British notion of an irresolvable Hindu-Muslim
dichotomy in India is deeply flawed and says more about
the colonialist mindset and insecurity than about the rest-
less subjects of the Raj themselves.12 To begin with, the
notion of two unified, monolithic communities of Hindu
and Muslim co-religionists is profoundly inaccurate and
does a great disservice to the cultural, linguistic, ethnic, and
indeed religious differences that characterize the many ad-
herents of these groups within the vast Indian subconti-
nent. This view also fails to recognize all those other
communities within the Indian social fabric, from Jains and
Sikhs to millions of tribal groups and many others. Finally,
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the presumptive position of the British Raj as arbiter be-
tween warring groups is belied by its own role and respon-
sibility in fostering local enmities and nationwide
grievances, as part of a colonial strategy of “divide and
rule.”13
But it is not only the British colonial view of the hard-
pressed, benevolent shepherd guiding the fractious natives
towards freedom that needs to be challenged in problema-
tizing the myth of the Partition. The story within the sub-
continent itself has  become  highly  charged,  in  the  first
instance by the effects of the tragic violence and destruction
of the post-Independence period, and by fifty years of
on-and-off tensions and conflicts, several wars, and decades
of political posturing. For nationalist elites in both India
and Pakistan—both of whom, as Ranajit Guha has argued,
were actively working to substitute the hegemonic power of
the British with that of their own14—the story of Partition
was one of an anti-colonial struggle whose success was
betrayed in part by the greed and desire for control of their
one-time partners in the drive to rid the subcontinent of
the British. The Pakistani mythology is shaped by the belief
that Muslims would always remain an oppressed minority
within an India ruled by Hindus. The Indian mythology,
on the other hand views Partition as the inevitable outcome
of the scheming and ever-increasing demands of the Mus-
lim leadership on the dreamt-for nation-state. But many of
the Subaltern Studies school of historians have called into
question such views. Gyanendra Pandey suggests that:
[the] historians’ history of Partition has, in India, been a history
of crisis for the Indian nation and the nationalist leadership. It
has been a history of the machinations which lay behind this
event, and the lessons to be drawn by the nation for the future.
This is not a history of the lives and experiences of the people
who lived through that time, of the way in which the events of
the 1940s were constructed in their minds, of the identities or
uncertainties that Partition created or reinforced. Even as a
history of crisis for the Indian nation, therefore, this history is
inadequate.15
The inadequacy of the mythologized views of Partition
is an impediment to both our historical understanding and
to the continued challenges of politics and life in the sub-
continent today. Religious groups in India and Pakistan
continue to draw on the Partition and its symbols as pow-
erful markers for their arguments today. The incident that
set off the horrific pogroms against Muslims in the state of
Gujarat, India, in 2002, for example, was the burning of a
train filled with Hindu worshippers. This act had a tremen-
dous cultural resonance in parts of northern and western
India, where memories of trainloads of dead arriving across
the borders of both Pakistan and India after Partition re-
surfaced.16 The Hindu right in India, as part of its program
of revising its own history and recasting its own collabora-
tionist past, has increasingly shifted responsibility for the
Partition away from Hindus, Sikhs, and even the British and
explicitly and vocally blamed the Muslims. Recent publica-
tions from adherents of the Hindu right in India have gone
so far as to call the experiences of the Hindus a “holocaust”
and compared the lives of Hindus in Pakistan and Bangla-
desh to those lived in a concentration camp.17 Such rhetoric
obscures the very “history of the lives and experiences of
the people who lived through that time” that Pandey calls
our attention to. As William van Schendel notes, the Parti-
tion is best understood not only in terms of nationalist and
anti-colonial politics (and ongoing antagonisms), but also
“as a cultural and personal disaster, the fissure of two major
regional cultures (Punjab and Bengal) which were divided
between the successor states, and the personal suffering and
traumatic memories of millions of uprooted refugees.”18
Differences in Partition Experiences
Indeed, the experience of Partition itself was markedly dif-
ferent in the two regions. Northern India, in which the
province of Punjab was divided and one half joined
Baluchistan, Sind, and the North-West Frontier Provinces
to form West Pakistan, witnessed a tremendous and violent
upheaval over a roughly three-year period (1947–1950),
characterized  mainly  by a population exchange between
Hindus and Sikhs coming to India and Muslims arriving in
Pakistan. This exchange was anything but orderly; however,
it did involve significant government intervention and reset-
tlement and rehabilitation efforts, with refugee populations
often occupying the homes and businesses of their departing
counterparts. A new capital city of Chandigarh was built for
the Indian province of Punjab while the national capital New
Delhi absorbed so many newcomers that it has been de-
scribed by some as a “city of refugees,” particularly of a
Punjabi refugee diaspora.19
In Eastern India, the Partition was similarly violent, but
occurred as part of a much more gradual, ongoing and
cyclical process, and with far less population exchange or
governmental intervention. The region being divided con-
sisted mainly of the province of Bengal, along with some
Muslim districts of neighbouring Assam. Interestingly, this
was not the first British Partition of Bengal, a once vast
province that had been progressively whittled down
through the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
under the guise of administrative reform. In 1905 the Brit-
ish had divided the province into Hindu and Muslim
halves, a move bitterly contested by Hindus in particular,
who had more to lose in terms of power and influence. By
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1911 the British had rescinded the order and rejoined the
two halves. But this earlier Partition of Bengal remained a
pivotal memory for many Bengalis, especially those who
had been involved in the nascent nationalist struggle and
who felt the British action was punishment for their politi-
cization.20
In 1947, when the second and permanent Partition oc-
curred, opposition to the move was much more muted.
Many Indian Bengalis continue to blame separatist senti-
ments amongst the Muslim leadership for the Partition of
Bengal, yet as Joya Chatterji and others have argued, Hindu
communalists were vociferous in their  demands for  an
autonomous, Hindu-dominated region of Bengal.21 And
indeed, the population flow was overwhelmingly from east
to west, by Hindus towards India. The exodus in fact pre-
ceded the actual Partition, beginning with the departure in
1946 of Hindus following riots in the districts of Noakhali
and Tippera in East Bengal. Over the next fifteen years, a
steady stream of people moved from East Pakistan to West
Bengal, some 5.28 million individuals between 1946 and
1970.22 The causes for this continuous flow were numer-
ous—the 1947 Partition and its aftermath, episodic riots
within East Pakistan (especially in the districts of Barisal
and Khulna), depressed economic conditions within the
region, the introduction of passports by India and Pakistan
to regulate travel (intended to stem the tide of migrants, but
in fact resulting in the opposite due to insecurities this
attempt caused), and conflicts within India and Pakistan
itself, whose impact reverberated within both halves of the
former Bengal and led to violence in each.23 In 1971 an even
greater number of refugees emerged due to a new crisis: the
brutal repression of Bangladeshi nationalists (both Muslim
and Hindu) by the West Pakistani army. Some estimates
suggest that as many as three million people were killed and
an additional twelve million fled as refugees to India.24
The Partition, then, was a very different phenomenon in
northwestern and eastern India. Refugees in the northwest,
some critics argue, were the prime beneficiaries of govern-
ment aid and attention from the new Indian state. Prafulla
Chakrabarty contends that this northwest-centric preoccu-
pation in the post-Independence period stems from the
placement of the power centres of the new Pakistan and
India in the north and west (and their proximity to each
other), rather than the  east.25 In  the decades  that have
followed, academic inquiry, popular literature, and cultural
representations have similarly focused mainly on Partition
narratives from the north.26 But those scholars who have
looked at the division of Bengal as a counterpoint to that of
Punjab have looked at the differential treatment of refugees
not only within the subcontinent, but within the separate
regions themselves. This is to say that disparities exist not
only between the treatment of northwestern and eastern
subjects of partition as Chakrabarty suggests, but within
and amongst the East Bengali (as doubtless with Punjabi)
refugees themselves.
Such disparities become abundantly clear if one looks at
the caste and class composition of East Bengali refugees and
at their resettlement experience in Calcutta, the primary
destination for most migrants. The earliest refugees, those
who came in the years 1946–1948, were mainly East Bengali
bhadralok. This is a category that describes a group who
have been variously described as a “westernised caste
elite,”27 the “dominant upper crust of Bengali society who
enjoyed a despotism of caste tempered by matriculation,”28
and a group of urban, professionalized, middle-class land-
owners. The term literally means “good-mannered peo-
ple,” and the self-proclaimed connotation is of
“respectability,” “education,” and “proper rearing,” It is
not easy to define the bhadralok through western categories
since they are usually—though not exclusively—upper
caste, distinguished by education and non-manual labour,
but unlike the middle class of western industrialized na-
tions, the bhadralok derived their power not from trade or
industry, but rather from land.29 It was their position as the
rentier aristocracy of the British colonial system—the
zamindari—that secured for the bhadralok their access to
capital, education, professional opportunities, and the at-
tendant benefits of a “refined” lifestyle.30 Refugees who
arrived in later periods, particularly from 1950 onwards,
were from a different segment of East Bengali society,
mainly peasants, agricultural and manual labourers, and
industrial workers, most from lower caste backgrounds.
Nilanjana Chatterjee has suggested that whereas the major-
ity of these later refugees fled from violence, many of the
earlier bhadralok refugees left because of a combined fear
of physical harm, a downturn in economic opportunities,
and a perceived loss of social standing and power.31
Resettlement and Migration of the East Bengali
Refugee Diasporas
While some of these various groups of refugees settled in
relatively contiguous areas (i.e. refugees who lived near bor-
der districts moved across the border into both the eastern
and northern parts of West Bengal), the vast major-
ity—some 70 per cent of those from East Pakistan—trav-
elled to Kolkata.32 This was particularly true for those fleeing
the central and western districts of East Pakistan, who there-
fore had in many ways the most alienating resettlement
experience to contend with. For the early bhadralok arrivals
in Kolkata, the time is one of considerable hardship and
transition, but the process is by and large one of integration
into Kolkata society. Many had no desire to be classified as
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refugees, with the social stigma attached to that status, and
certainly they had no desire to settle in the government-run
refugee camps. Rather, the bhadralok built on existing social
networks and contacts with friends and family to help them
resettle and integrate into the economic and political life of
the region.33 In some cases, bhadralok families already had
established residences in both eastern and western Ben-
gal—a city and a country home, or an industry in Kolkata
and a landed estate in East Bengal—and their transition was
made easier. For others, the move to Kolkata meant moving
from luxury to (relative) privation, living in cramped quar-
ters, rebuilding lives under difficult circumstances.
For the lower class and caste refugees from East Pakistan,
those who came from 1950 onwards, the experience was
considerably different. They did not  have  access to  the
social networks of the bhadralok who preceded them. Most
of the lower class and caste refugees had also been displaced
from industrial occupations and agricultural or fisheries-
based livelihoods. While the influx of many new bhadralok
into Kolkata had caused some degree of labour market
displacement within the urban economy, this impact was
minimal and confined primarily to the professional sector.
For the lower caste and class refugees, there were many
fewer jobs to compete for. In many cases, these later refu-
gees were in fact sundered by a new border from work itself,
as the Partition drew an artificial line between lives and
livelihoods where one might find all of a sudden that one’s
work was now located in another country.34
Additionally, many Partition refugees from this period
had difficulty in even being recognized as such, a problem
that was to be repeated in the coming decades. Those who
were classified as refugees were given identity cards and
placed in one of two types of housing, refugee colonies or
refugee camps. Those in the former received some level of
resettlement and rehabilitation assistance, while those in
the latter were granted less.35 But the definition of refugee
status itself was becoming quickly and hotly contested in
Bengal, further affecting the treatment of those fleeing East
Pakistan. In the aftermath of Partition, the Government of
India had defined refugees in the following way:
A displaced person is one who had entered India (who left or
who was compelled to leave his home in East Pakistan on or
after October 15, 1947) for disturbances or fear of such distur-
bances or on account of setting up of the two dominions of India
and Pakistan.”36
But by the 1970s, the terms “refugee” and “displaced”
had increasingly been replaced in official language by “mi-
grants.” Indeed, the Government of West Bengal today
draws a clear distinction between “new” and “old” mi-
grants:
(a) Those who migrated between October 1946 and 31
March 1958 are known as old ‘migrants’
(b) Those who came between 1 January 1964 and 25
March 1971 are known as ‘new migrants’37
Such definitions reflect the growing distrust and suspi-
cion with which the central Indian government, the state
authorities in West Bengal, and a sizable section of middle-
class and elite Bengali society viewed the ongoing popula-
tion flow from East Pakistan. If the early years of Partition
had elicited sympathy for the horrors that the survivors of
violence were fleeing, by the 1960s many policy makers and
politicians wondered aloud whether refugees were in fact
fleeing violence or merely leaving a stagnant local economy
for brighter prospects in the western half of the former
Bengal.38 It is undeniable that the massive and ongoing
influx of refugees was a tremendous drain on social services
and had a considerable impact on the political and eco-
nomic structure of both the state of West Bengal and the
city of Kolkata. Kolkata in particular has long suffered from
a reputation as a disordered and chaotic metropolis, yet it
is hard to imagine any urban space increasing by a third in
population over such a short span of time and still main-
taining itself without difficulties.
Double Displacements: Forced Relocations of East
Bengali Refugees
Despite these obvious problems, the treatment that many
refugees from East Pakistan received at the hands of the state
and central governments in India during the 1950s and
1960s is hard to justify. This ranged from denying them
adequate aid, resources, and  opportunities to outlawing
some of their settlements to outright forcible relocations.
This last included transporting large numbers of East Ben-
gali refugees to distant regions of India such as the Andamar
and Nicobar Islands, Bettiah in Bihar, and the Dan-
dakaranya district of Madhya Pradesh.39 The last is a par-
ticularly notorious case, with tens of thousands of peasants
from the former East Bengal resettled in a hill-area. There
was a dual purpose to this project: rehabilitation of the East
Bengal refugees and the “civilization” of a local tribal group
through enforced contact with the newcomers. This (as with
many of the other experiments) was by most accounts an
abject failure, with conflicts arising between tribals and
refugees and the inability of many of these Bengalis from
agricultural backgrounds to adjust to cultivation in a very
different environment and resource base.40
The East Bengali refugees did not, of course, accept this
situation meekly. Transportation to Dandakaranya and
other distant places was vocally opposed by the refugee
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populations. Indeed, several thousand refugees even re-
turned to Bengal from Dandakaranya, occupying an unin-
habited island for some time before being again forcibly
evicted by the government.41 And as early as 1949, refugee
activists had mobilized their communities in order to pro-
vide shelter and livelihoods  for  themselves, rather than
relying on aid from various levels of government. One of
the most visible signs of this mobilization was in the devel-
opment of the squatters’ colonies on the edges of Kolkata,
known as jabar dakhal.42 These were large areas of vacant
land, owned either privately by landlords or by the govern-
ment. In some cases parcels of land were purchased legally;
in others, a process of collective takeover simply established
the refugee presence as a community on the ground. They
were inhabited mainly by middle-class and working-class
refugees from East Pakistan, those who eschewed (and had
the means to avoid) living in the government-run refugee
camps. By 1950 there were close to 150 refugee colonies,
concentrated mainly around the southeastern portion of
Kolkata and often butting right up against the mansions of
the wealthy. These locations gave residents in the refugee
colonies access to a range of possible livelihoods including
aquaculture, farming, and work in the industrial sector.43
Such initiative was, however, looked upon with consid-
erable suspicion by the central government, which at-
tempted  to regulate the conversion  of  both public  and
private lands into more permanent dwellings for refugees
by passing the Eviction of Persons in Unauthorised Occu-
pation Land Bill in 1951.  Refugees  in both camps  and
colonies mobilized against this, as they would later against
forcible transportation, by forming collective organizations
and committees, such as the umbrella organization, the
United Central Refugee Council (UCRC), and by launching
non-violent political agitations.44 The political activities of
the refugees met with varying levels of success and resis-
tance over the years, but the camps and colonies proved a
fertile base of support for at least one regional political
party. The Communist  Party of  India-Marxist  (CPIM),
which would go on to rule West Bengal from 1977 onwards,
was one of the first political organizations to pay explicit
attention to the demands of the refugees and thereby won
their early support.
Yet despite these hard-fought struggles to recognize their
plight, the refugees from East Bengal have not disappeared
from the landscape of Kolkata. Unlike many of those who
arrived in the early years before, during, and just after
Partition, the later refugees (or “migrants” as the govern-
ment calls them) have not become assimilated into a
broader Kolkatan or West Bengali society. Even today,
some 931 refugee colonies and camps are recognized by the
Kolkata Metropolitan Development Authority; scholars
claim that a further 998 exist without official sanction.45
And unlike the South Kolkata colonies that eventually be-
came respectable middle-class neighborhoods of the bhad-
ralok, the refugee camps and colonies in the north, east, and
west of the city remain identifiable as such, similar in form
to the hundreds of slums (or bustis) that dot the metropoli-
tan region.
Both of these particular manifestations of the East Ben-
gali refugee diaspora—the one represented by the bhad-
ralok of Kolkata and their international brethren, and the
one that lives in the slums and camps on the edges of the
city—are locked today in an ongoing struggle over a region
to which they (as well as others) have both a cultural and
an historical claim. This contest over home, place, and
memory is being played out particularly noticeably in the
development of housing projects on the southern and east-
ern fringes of the city. It is in these areas that the Kolkata
Metropolitan Development Authority has plans for refugee
colony development projects (along the lines of the ubiq-
uitous “slum improvement” initiatives undertaken across
India) in three phases which will involve 174, 324, and 88
colonies, respectively.46 But these are also the same regions
that have seen an enormous increase over the past ten years
in new western-style housing projects and their requisite
attendant facilities (shopping malls, country clubs, and
entertainment complexes). The construction continues at
a furious pace, in areas that are ecologically sensitive, pro-
vide a majority of the foodstuffs for urban markets in
Kolkata, and are both home and livelihood to many of the
East Bengali refugees. But many of these homes and refugee
colonies are, as noted earlier, the result of illegal occupation
of land. And despite the fact that some residents have lived
in these regions for decades—many since Partition it-
self—with established livelihoods and social networks, tens
of thousands find themselves once again facing the prospect
of displacement.
Ironically, the market towards which the new housing
projects are aimed is primarily the international Bengali
diaspora which has, as noted previously, deep roots in the
Partition experience itself. Interviews with developers and
promoters of these housing complexes indicate that be-
tween 25 per cent and 75 per cent of apartment ownership
is by overseas Indians—both the so-called “non-resident
Indians” (NRIs) and “persons of Indian Origin” (PIOs).47
Promotional Web sites and advertisements explicitly target
diasporic groups—or those who wish to live like them. A
highly visible advertising campaign on billboards through-
out Kolkata for the South City Projects promises would-be
buyers that they can “live the way the world does.” Other
complexes offer “western-style amenities” and send travel-
ling sales caravans to diasporas in London, New Jersey, and
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Toronto. Shopping malls in Kolkata’s peri-urban fringes
are similarly constructed with assumed diasporic sensibili-
ties and pocketbooks in mind. The best and brightest in
multinational brands are represented amongst the retailers
and the malls replicate the “big box” concept so prevalent
in suburban North America. It is the life of the wealthy,
middle-class North American in particular, idealized in the
figure of the successful NRI who has “made it” as an IT,
medical, engineering, business, academic, or legal profes-
sional, that is being sold here, paradoxically both to Indians
and NRIs/PIOs alike. In the case of the diasporic Indians,
seeing themselves represented as success stories through
Bollywood cinema, Indian television and song, as well as in
various governments’ new attraction to their capital, serves
to reinforce this particular image of what it means to be a
member of the diaspora.
One member of a local social movement in Kolkata that
has challenged displacement due to urban development
recently asked, as we walked by a project of 36-storey
apartment  buildings  set amidst golf courses, swimming
pools, country clubs and other gated communities, “Why
do overseas Bengalis feel that they need to live in the
wind?”48 The phrase “living in the wind” is a play on
another local advertising campaign which tells apartment
buyers that they can “live in the sky” in a 36-storey building
(constructed on recently filled alluvial soil). It also denotes
a sense of transience attributed to some members of the
diaspora and their attachment to a local place, at least in the
estimation of people like the speaker. To those like him, the
new development complexes are clearly aimed at diasporic
groups and their assumed needs and desires, a set of pref-
erences that is removed at  several levels  from those of
“ordinary” Bengalis, set above and apart and ephemeral all
at once. Yet for many other Indians within India—particu-
larly in the emerging and enlarging middle classes—the
NRI and the lifestyle associated with them has equally
become an object of aspiration. This segment of the Bengali
refugee diaspora, in this sense, is sustaining and transform-
ing a somewhat idealized homeland—at the same time that
they are themselves sustained and transformed by events
and perceptions within their homeland. But should their
ongoing attachment to “home” supersede the claims and
lives of another group who are themselves seriously affected
by these developments?
Conclusion
Is it possible, in light of the case described above, to identify
a single, unified East Bengali refugee diaspora, with a shared
set of experiences and memories of displacement? If any-
thing, the evidence would indicate the opposite, that indeed
the Partition of Bengal and the gradual process of displace-
ment that followed resulted in the creation of multiple
refugee diasporas, including ones that settled in various
parts of West Bengal, notably Kolkata, and ones that traveled
as part of a postcolonial globalization process to areas such
as North America and Europe. The latter are not refugee
diasporas  in  many commonsense  understandings of  the
term, not fleeing from violence, not settling in exile in a
foreign land, not even removed unwillingly to a different
part of their own country. Yet I would argue that an integral
component of the cultural fabric for much of the interna-
tional Indian-Bengali diaspora is in fact the experience of
Partition. This stems in part from the fact that much of this
diaspora is composed culturally and socially in large part by
the bhadralok.
Unlike the Sikh, Gujarati, Marathi, or South Indian
groups—part of a global Indian diaspora that is some 20
million strong—who emigrated in earlier periods as wage-
labourers, traders, and workers in agriculture, forestry, and
the service sector, Bengalis from India have emigrated over-
whelmingly as professionals. Most have emigrated as highly
trained doctors, lawyers, engineers, and academics. In di-
asporic settings from New Jersey to London to Toronto,
their children often follow in their footsteps, echoing the
century-old bhadralok preoccupation with scholastics,
learning, and upward mobility. For these prabasi (overseas)
Bengalis in particular, select memories of the Partition
dominate their imaginary images of East Bengal as a land
of rivers and fields and countryside; indeed, recalling the
very real political, economic, and social importance of land
itself in their existence. As a child growing up in the Bengali
diaspora in Canada, such narratives are familiar to me—the
tales of a land left long behind, the unspeakable violence
experienced, the years following Partition spent in depriva-
tion and misery, families huddled together in tiny rooms,
the indelible scars of the past etched into our present. Even
today, friends of my generation in the Bengali diaspora talk
of their parents’ unwillingness to sell their homes and say,
“Well, a house is so important to them, you know, because
they lived through the Partition. . . .”
Yet  what such monolithic narratives  of the  Partition
obscure are the diverse, complex, multi-faceted, and grad-
ual processes that in fact characterize the displacement and
diasporic journeys of East Bengali Hindus. The discourse
of a singular Partition experience that was uniform in its
tragedies, its effects, and its outcomes belies the ongoing
existence of a refugee diaspora within Kolkata itself. These
are those millions who still live in refugee camps and colo-
nies, many of them little more than slums, who have formed
discrete communities, workers’ collectives, hawkers’ asso-
ciations, and myriad other social and political organiza-
tions that assert their identities as apart from that of the
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broader West Bengali population. They call themselves the
bastuharas or udbastus; literally, “homeless” or more evo-
catively “home-land-less”.49 Their experiences contradict
many of the myths that continue to prevail within both
West Bengal and the international Bengali diaspora regard-
ing the Partition of 1947. It is in focusing on the experiences
of the various diasporas produced by events such as the
Partition that the importance of the category of “refugee
diaspora” itself is understood in terms of forced migration
and identity in an age of globalization.
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